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ABSTRACT 
Decades of research attest that memory processes suffer under 
conditions of auditory distraction. What is however less well understood is 
whether people are able to modify how their memory processes are 
deployed in order to compensate for disruptive effects of distraction. The 
metacognitive approach to memory describes a variety of ways people can 
exert control over their cognitive processes to optimize performance. Here 
we describe our recent investigations into how these control processes 
change under conditions of auditory distraction. We specifically looked at 
control of encoding in the form of decisions about how long to study a 
word when it is presented and control of memory reporting in the form of 
decisions whether to volunteer or withhold retrieved details. Regarding 
control of encoding, we expected that people would compensate for 
disruptive effects of distraction by extending study time under noise. Our 
results revealed, however, that when exposed to irrelevant speech, people 
curtail rather than extend study. Regarding control of memory reporting, 
we expected that people would compensate for the loss of access to 
memory records by volunteering responses held with lower confidence. 
Our results revealed, however, that people’s reporting strategies do not 
differ when memory task is performed in silence or under auditory 
distraction, although distraction seriously undermines people’s confidence 
in their own responses. Together, our studies reveal novel avenues for 
investigating the psychological effects of auditory distraction within a 
metacognitive framework. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Auditory distraction is ubiquitous in modern life, significantly 
affecting our cognitive performance. One area in which impact of auditory 
distraction has been investigated is memory. Perhaps not surprisingly, a 
significant body of research testifies to the fact that auditory distraction 
impairs memory performance. This has been established in memory tasks 
as diverse as serial recall of short bits of information, like letters or 
numbers (e.g., Beaman & Jones, 1997), as well as recall or recognition of 
more meaningful materials, ranging from lists of words (e.g., Jones, 
Marsh, & Hughes, 2012) to TED lectures (Zeamer & Fox Tree, 2013).  
Auditory distraction seems to be a particularly hazardous to memory 
performance as by its very nature it is difficult to avoid. However, the 
metacognitive approach to investigating memory underscores that people 
always possess a degree of control over their memory performance as 
they can modify the encoding and retrieval operations. Thus, for example, 
people may decide how long they study, or how study trials are 
distributed in time. These decisions are known to affect memory 
performance (see Koriat, 2007, for a review). Similarly, at retrieval people 
may decide how long to search their memory for studied material or which 
of the retrieved detail to volunteer in a final report, again exerting control 
over memory performance. In the present paper, our initial investigations 
into how metacognitive control over encoding and retrieval is changed by 
the presence of auditory distraction will be presented. 
ENCODING 
The simplest way of exerting control over encoding operations is 
revealed by people’s decisions on how long certain information is studied. 
Decades of research conducted within a metacognition framework of 
memory have revealed that people distribute study time among different 
study items in a purposeful way, aiming for maximizing memory 
performance (e.g., Mazzoni, Cornoldi, & Marchitelli, 1990). Given that 
distraction impairs memory, it can be hypothesized that if people were 
given freedom as to how long they wish to study, they would compensate 
for harmful effects of auditory distraction by extending study times.  
Here we present two experiments that, to our knowledge, for the 
first time investigate study strategies people adopt in the face of auditory 
distraction. By providing people with free rein over study duration, we 
focus on how auditory distraction determines the latencies to terminate 
study for items people are asked to memorize. We assess whether people 
would try to compensate for auditory distraction by extending study. We 
also examine whether people are aware of the negative impact of auditory 
distraction on their memory performance, a precondition of strategic 
compensation for distraction, and how any potential changes in study 
times under distraction impact upon final memory performance. 
In Experiment 1 participants were presented for study and 
immediate free recall with fifteen lists of categorized words, each list with 
fifteen different words (e.g., buffalo, lion, elephant, etc.) During study, 
the presence of auditory distraction was manipulated but all recall tests 
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were performed in silence. There were three distraction conditions, 
defined by conditions of study. In the silent condition, for the one third of 
study lists, no auditory distraction was played. In the unrelated distraction 
condition, for another one third of study lists, auditory distraction was 
played which was semantically unrelated to studied items. In this 
condition, auditory distraction consisted of a stream of continuously 
spoken words belonging to a single semantic category that was different 
than the category used for the study list. Finally, in the related distraction 
condition, for the final one third of study lists, auditory distraction was 
played which was semantically related to studied items. This was achieved 
by using as auditory distracters, again played a continuous stream of 
spoken words, items that belonged to the same semantic category as 
studied items. Two different types of auditory distraction, semantically 
related and semantically unrelated to the material to be remembered, 
were used because earlier research revealed that auditory distraction is 
particularly harmful when related to items participants strive to memorize 
(Marsh, Hughes, & Jones, 2008). Thus, it was of interest if any pattern of 
change in metacognitive control revealed for the unrelated distraction 
condition would be exaggerated in the related distraction condition. 
The outlined design is similar to previous investigations on auditory 
distraction in memory performance. The main change introduced here was 
that the rate of presentation of studied words was not controlled by 
experimenter but by participants. Specifically, participants were asked to 
press the spacebar to proceed to another word during the whole period of 
each study phase. The latencies to press the spacebar were recorded and 
constitute the main dependent measure examined here. An additional 
change in the procedure was that after each study list but before the free 
recall test for this list participants were asked to predict how many of the 
just studied 15 items they are likely to recall. This procedure is usually 
referred to as an aggregate judgment-of-learning and was introduced in 
order to assess whether participants perceive auditory distraction to be 
harmful to memory performance. 
The results of Experiment 1 are presented in Table 1. First, the 
usual pattern of distraction effects on recall performance was replicated. 
Performance was clearly the best in the silent condition, worse in the 
unrelated distraction condition, t(29) = 4.66, SE = .02, p < .001, and still 
worse in the related distraction condition, a marginally significant effect, 
t(29) = 2.00, SE = .01, p = .054. Thus, despite the opportunity to 
regulate study times, auditory distraction still impaired memory 
performance, particularly if it was semantically related to memoranda. 
Second, participants’ predictions of recall performance were sensitive to 
the deleterious effects of distraction, as participants clearly predicted that 
their recall will be better in the silent condition than in the unrelated 
distraction condition, t(29) = 4.96, SE = .02, p < .001. Predictions also 
were somewhat higher for the unrelated distraction than the related 
distraction condition, a marginally significant effect, t(29) = 1.72, SE = 
.01, p = .097, which also mirrors a difference in recall performance. 
Together, these results indicate that although participants were aware 
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that distraction negatively impacts recall, they failed to compensate for 
this effect by extending study times. But did they even try to 
compensate? The analysis of study times revealed that participants 
studied longer in the silent condition than both in the unrelated 
distraction, t(29) = 3.29, SE = 161, p = .003, and the related distraction 
condition, t(29) = 3.92, SE = 127, p < .001, which did not differ, t < 1. 
Thus, not only participants did not try to compensate for distraction but 
they actually curtailed study when distraction was present. 
Table 1: Proportion of recalled items, predictions converted to proportions, and study 
times in milliseconds in Experiment 1 and 2 (standard errors in parentheses). 
Experiment 
Distraction 
condition 
Study times Recall Predictions Study times 
Experiment 1 Silent  .57 (.02) .51 (.02) 2945 (319) 
 Related  .46 (.02) .40 (.02) 2416 (251) 
 Unrelated  .48 (.02) .42 (.02) 2447 (269) 
Experiment 2 Silent Free .52 (.03) .50 (.02) 2439 (238) 
  Set .53 (.02) .49 (.02) - 
 Distraction Free .47 (.02) .45 (.02) 2211 (197) 
  Set .49 (.02) .44 (.02) - 
 
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that compensation by extended 
study is not a strategy participants adopt in the presence of auditory 
distraction. Instead, presented with auditory distraction – whether 
semantically related or unrelated to memoranda – participants actually 
accelerate the presentation of the study items. A plausible explanation for 
this effect is that participants try to limit their exposure to the 
continuously presented distracters. What Experiment 1 is however unable 
to answer is whether participants strategy of limiting study time bears 
upon recall performance. For this, the design would have to include a 
comparison group with set study times. Replicating the main results of 
Experiment 1 and examining the effects of changes in study times under 
distraction by comparing memory performance to a reference condition 
with set study times were the objectives for Experiment 2. 
Experiment 2 compared silent and unrelated distraction conditions. 
Since the related distraction condition did not differ in terms of study 
times from the unrelated distraction condition in Experiment 1, it was 
dropped from the present investigation. The main change in Experiment 2 
was that an additional condition was included in which all study words 
were presented for three seconds (the order of conditions was 
counterbalanced across participants). All participants performed the 
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study-recall task in the free study times condition for 10 lists (five in the 
silent and five in the distraction condition) and the same task in the set 
study times condition for another 10 lists (again five in the silent and five 
in the distraction condition). In this set study times condition participants 
had no control over the rate of presentation of studied items.  
The results of Experiment 2 are presented in Table 1. The analysis of 
study times in the free study time conditions revealed a pattern of results 
replicating the main finding of Experiment 1. Specifically, participants 
curtailed their study times when auditory distraction was present as 
compared to the silent condition, t(29) = 2.32, SE = 98, p = .028. The 
analysis of participants’ predictions of recall with a 2 (distraction: silent 
vs. distraction) x 2 (control: free vs. set study times) ANOVA revealed 
only a significant main effect of distraction, F(1, 29) = 30.21, MSE = .002, 
p < .001, once again testifying to the fact that participants were aware of 
the harmful effects of auditory distraction. Most importantly, the analysis 
of recall performance with a similar 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed only a 
significant effect of distraction, F(1, 29) = 13.96, MSE = .05, p = .001. 
The interaction was not significant, F < 1, indicating that distraction 
impaired recall performance equally in the free and set study times 
condition. Thus, curtailing of study time under distraction that was 
observed in the free study time condition did not lead to an exaggerated 
impairment in free recall performance. 
The results of both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 suggests that 
contrary to the initial hypothesis, people do not try to compensate for 
harmful effects of distraction on memory performance by extending study 
when distraction is present. On the contrary, both experiments 
documented the opposite effect of shortening study under distraction. On 
the first blush, it seems that participants may behave maladaptive by 
studying shorter under more difficult conditions. However, Experiment 2 
clearly shows that shorter study times in the setting used in our 
experiments do not harm memory performance. Thus, participants’ 
behaviour under distraction can be called adaptive inasmuch as the same 
level of attainment was achieved in a shorter time. 
RETRIEVAL 
The common knowledge in the literature is that although memory 
can be easily improved at the time of encoding, there is not much one can 
do to improve it at the time of retrieval. For example, although longer 
study times are often found to improve memory performance, longer 
retrieval latencies usually fail to yield additional recalled information 
(Malmberg, 2008). From this perspective, it would seem that people will 
not have ways to alleviate distraction effects at the time of retrieval. 
Despite bleak perspectives on aiding the process of retrieval itself, 
the metacognitive approach to memory shows that participants do 
possess means of regulating memory performance at the time of retrieval. 
This follows from the fact that the core memory process of retrieval is not 
the only factor determining memory performance. Indeed, memory 
performance is assessed based on an overt memory report, which is 
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composed from details retrieved from memory but only these details 
people decide to disclose based on their metacognitive judgment. Put 
simply, to retrieve information is not enough to improve memory 
performance if this information is not volunteered in a memory report. 
Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) proposed a metacognitive framework 
of strategic regulation of memory accuracy, which describes the processes 
by which people assess the validity of retrieved information and decide 
which details should be volunteered and which should be withheld. 
According to this framework, when information is retrieved from memory, 
a variety of clues are used to assess confidence that this information is 
correct (see Koriat, 1997, for a typology of clues). The next step comes 
when confidence in accuracy of retrieved information is compared to a 
criterion level of confidence that warrants volunteering of information in a 
memory report. In this framework, the accuracy of a memory report for 
which withholding of information is allowed (i.e., people may respond 
‘don’t know’ to a memory question) depends on number of factors of 
which most prominent are: a) accuracy of memory retrieval, b) accuracy 
of metacognitive monitoring – that is the extent to which correct retrieved 
details are associated with higher levels of confidence than incorrect 
retrieved details, c) criterial level of confidence (a report criterion), d) 
general level of confidence in the retrieved details.  
The Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) framework can be applied to 
understanding memory reporting under distraction. Even though people 
may not be able to improve retrieval under distraction, they could 
nevertheless be able to modify metacognitive processes in such a way as 
to mitigate or at least alter the effects of distraction. A recent study on 
auditory distraction conducted by Perfect, Andrade, and Eagan (2011) 
demonstrates how this may occur. In this study it was found that under 
conditions of auditory distraction at test, people report the same volume 
of correct information as in the silent condition, but they also report 
markedly more incorrect details. This is a reversal of a usual pattern in 
which people report fewer correct details under distraction (e.g., Marsh et 
al., 2008) and it may indicate that participants in the study by Perfect et 
al. adopted a more liberal report criterion under auditory distraction. 
The experiment described here addressed the issue of metacognitive 
regulation of memory reporting under auditory distraction. It was 
examined how auditory distraction affects the accuracy of metacognitive 
monitoring at retrieval as well as the placement of a report criterion. The 
memory and metamemory processes were examined in the procedure 
including free-report recognition test, which allowed for ‘don’t know’ 
responding, forced-report recognition test, which disallowed ‘don’t know’ 
responding and a confidence judgement phase (for forced-report 
responses), which provided data relevant to metacognitive monitoring and 
report criterion (see Hanczakowski, Pasek, Zawadzka, & Mazzoni, 2013, 
for a similar testing procedure). The changes in metacognitive processes 
were linked to changes in memory performance by examining both the 
quality and quantity of information provided in a memory report. 
Specifically, the quality of a report was assessed by examining the gains 
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in accuracy of reported details when moving from a forced-report to a 
free-report test. By responding ‘don’t know’ on a free-report test 
participants should generally increase the quality of output thanks to 
withholding some of the responses that would be incorrect on the forced-
report test. The quantity of correct information provided in a memory 
report was assessed by examining the losses in the number of correct 
responses when moving from a forced-report to a free-report test. By 
responding ‘don’t know’ on a free report test participants should generally 
reduce the volume of correct information reported. Of interest is how 
changes in quality and quantity of output, in other words gain and losses 
arising from using the ‘don’t know’ option, are affected by distraction. 
In Experiment 3 participants studied four lists consisting of 48 pairs 
of unrelated words. Three two-alternative recognition tests followed each 
list. The test varied the nature of targets and foils, but since this 
manipulation failed to interact with the distraction manipulation in any of 
the analyses, for simplicity it will not be discussed here and the data will 
be collapsed across three different types of recognition tests. Each 
recognition test involved three consecutive steps for each pair of a target 
and a foil. First, participants were asked to indicate a target only if sure 
and to respond ‘don’t know’ otherwise (free-report). Second, they were 
asked to indicate a target, guessing if necessary (forced-report). Third, 
they were asked to rate confidence that the forced-report response was 
correct. The presence of distraction was manipulated so that every 
participant completed two lists in silence and for the two remaining lists 
auditory distraction was played both at encoding and at test. Similarly to 
Experiments 1 and 2, distraction consisted of a continuous stream of 
spoken words, which in this case belonged to several semantic categories.  
The results of Experiment 3 can be found in Table 2. Focusing first 
on the hit rates in forced-report recognition tests, which constitute a 
measure of memory retrieval, it is clear that auditory distraction lowered 
recognition performance, t(41) = 3.74, SE = .01, p = .001. This result 
simply confirms that memory retrieval is impeded by auditory distraction. 
The analyses of the measure of the accuracy of metacognitive monitoring, 
Ag (computed on the basis of confidence judgements, see Masson & 
Rotello, 2009, for details), showed it also to be reduced under distraction, 
t(36) = 2.03, SE = .02, p = .049. Thus, auditory distraction impaired 
participants’ ability to recognize which their responses were correct and 
which were incorrect. Did participants try to compensate for these harmful 
effects of distraction by changing their report criterion, as the results of 
Perfect et al. (2011) suggest? The analysis of the measure of report 
criterion, Prc (computed on the basis of confidence judgements and ‘don’t 
know’ responses, see Koriat and Goldsmith, 1996, for details) failed to 
reveal any differences between silent and distraction conditions, t < 1. 
Thus, although distraction affected both memory and metacognitive 
processes, participants in did not adjust their report criterion to 
compensate for the loss of correct responses under distraction. 
Further analyses of the results of Experiment 3 concerned gains and 
losses brought about by withholding responses in the silent and distraction 
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conditions. The analysis of gains in quality, measured as a difference in 
the proportions of correct responses out of all responses volunteered 
between free- and forced-report tests, revealed a marginally significant 
effect of distraction condition, t(40) = 1.91, SE = .01, p = .063. Although 
this suggests that when participants were free to withhold responses they 
gained slightly more in terms of accuracy of a memory report in the 
distraction condition, this effect was no longer significant when the 
analysis was repeated with the differences in forced-report recognition 
performance between silent and distraction condition as a covariate, F < 
1. Overall, these results indicate that participants gained more in terms of 
accuracy from withholding responses under distraction chiefly due to the 
fact that with forced-report recognition performance impaired by 
distraction they had simply more to gain. 
The analysis of losses in quantity, measured as a difference in the 
proportions of correct responses out of all questions asked between free- 
and forced-report tests, revealed a significant effect of distraction 
condition, t(41) = 3.71, SE = .01, p = .003. This indicates that 
participants lost more correct responses by exercising the ‘don’t know’ 
option under distraction. Interestingly, this effect was eliminated when a 
difference in the rate of ‘don’t know’ responses between quiet and 
distraction conditions was used as a covariate, F < 1. This suggests that 
participants lost more correct responses under distraction because they 
were more willing to withhold responses under distraction. This more 
conservative reporting was not caused by any changes in report criterion, 
as the previous analyses testified, but instead was caused by the fact that 
participants were generally much less confident in their responses when 
distraction was present. This was revealed by a comparison of mean of 
confidence judgements between silent and distraction conditions, t(41) = 
5.57, SE = 0.75, p < .001.  
Table 2: Forced-report recognition, metacognitive resolution (Ag), report criterion 
(Prc), gains in quality, losses in quantity and mean confidence in Experiment 3. 
Condition 
Forced 
recognition 
Ag Prc Gains Losses Confidence 
Silent .78 (.02) .72 (.02) 66 (2.1) .08 (.01) .23 (.02) 77 (1.6) 
Distraction .74 (.02) .69 (.02) 67 (2.3) .10 (.01) .27 (.02) 72 (1.6) 
 
Together, the results of Experiment 3 paint a complex picture of the 
effects of auditory distraction on metacognitive processes at retrieval. 
First and foremost, participants did not try to compensate for negative 
effects of distraction by volunteering responses held with lower levels of 
confidence. Instead, participants adopted the same level of confidence in 
the silent and distraction condition. This had a somewhat unexpected 
consequence of exaggerating losses in correct responses that were caused 
by using the ‘don’t know’ option in the free-report recognition tests. 
Because distraction lowered the overall level of confidence in retrieved 
responses, fewer of these responses passed the rigid response criterion 
and thus fewer of them were volunteered. Thus, participants’ reduced 
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performance in the free-report test under auditory distraction reflected at 
least two separate effects of distraction: the memory effect of impaired 
retrieval and the metacognitive effect of greater inclination to withhold 
responses. The present results show that the effects of distraction on 
metacognitive processes may lead to potentiated effects on performance 
rather than the recruitment of compensatory strategies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In three experiments we investigated the effects of auditory 
distraction on metacognitive processes during encoding and retrieval. The 
experiments were based on the assumption that metacognitive processes 
may be used to compensate for harmful effects that distraction has on 
memory processes. Thus, we hypothesised that people may try to 
compensate for distraction by devoting more resources to the task of 
encoding – by lengthening study times – and by volunteering more 
retrieved details at the time of the test. The results of three experiments 
were inconsistent with these initial hypotheses. Not only did our 
participants fail to compensate for auditory distraction, they actually 
adopted metacognitive strategies that were opposite to the predicted 
compensatory ones. Thus, under conditions of auditory distraction 
participants shortened study times and volunteered fewer responses in a 
memory test compared to the silent condition. 
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